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Abstract 
 
This experience and research based paper discusses 
the reasons that software cannot be trusted and then 
explains how the use of greatly improved documenta-
tion can make software more trustworthy. It shows 
how tabular expressions can be used to prepare soft-
ware documents that are both precise and easily used 
by developers, inspectors, and testers. The paper re-
views a number of "tried and true" ideas and illus-
trates some new refinements in the methods that re-
sulted from recent research.  It is intended both to tell 
developers of techniques available to them and to sug-
gest new research areas. 
Keywords: critical software, documentation, specifica-
tions, testing. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Telephony, cameras, car radios, and power plants 
are all vastly improved by the availability of program-
mable processors. Because the hardware is program-
mable, it can be mass-produced making the processors 
are far less expensive to produce than the custom 
hardware that it replaces. Programmability also means 
that products can be improved without changing the 
hardware. Often, the software includes programs that 
download and install a new version of itself. More-
over, in applications such as power-plant control, we 
can introduce much more refined behaviour, i.e. makes 
finer distinctions, than we could make when all such 
functions were “hard-wired”. Software also allows us 
to collect and display more operating data than would 
be possible with older technologies. 
We do not need to look far to see that people are 
wary of software. Not too long ago, experts in soft-
ware-safety were saying that they would not fly in an 
aircraft that was controlled by software. Today we can 
read long articles from other experts who believe that 
software cannot be trusted for a simple job like count-
ing votes. The reasons for this lack of trust are many 
and complex; we list a few of them in the next section. 
 
2. Trustworthiness of software 
 
The following factors impact trustworthiness of 
software and hardware systems: 
• Software is usually very difficult to in-
spect/understand. 
• Software is difficult to test. 
• There is often lack of agreement on the func-
tions required of software products. 
Difficult to inspect/understand. Decades of ex-
perience have made it clear that we find it difficult to 
understand long programs. When trying to understand 
and verify the correctness of a long program, we must 
decompose it into small parts and (provisionally) asso-
ciate a function with each one. We must then convince 
ourselves that:  
• If each part implements its assigned function, 
the whole program will be correct,  
• Each part implements its assigned function.  
Frequently, we find that our provisional assump-
tions do not correspond exactly to what the program-
mer intended or what the program does. Then, after 
revising our initial division and function descriptions, 
we try again. In principle, this iterative process con-
verges and we learn whether or not the program is cor-
rect. In practice, we usually give up before we have a 
complete understanding of the program. The process 
terminates when we run out of time or patience. 
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This inspection/understanding process is also unre-
liable because it depends on imprecise descriptions of 
component functions supplemented by the inspector’s 
memory and assumptions. A program may look correct 
but be wrong because a small detail was not mentioned 
or forgotten. People do not trust devices whose design 
is so complex that nobody seems to understand them. 
Until we improve our ability to understand and inspect 
software, it will not be trusted.  
Difficult to test. One of the most often quoted re-
marks by the late software pioneer E. W. Dijkstra is 
“Program testing can be used to show the presence of 
bugs, but never to show their absence” [4]. This re-
mark is based on the fact that the number of possible 
tests for even simple programs is very large and it is 
usually possible to find a program that will pass every 
test that you have done but fail every other. Conse-
quently, in most cases, we never know when we have 
tested enough. In sharp contrast to older technologies, 
interpolation does not work properly for the discrete 
functions that describe the behaviour of software. The 
result is that, even after extensive testing has been per-
formed, errors are found by users. One can never be 
sure that all those errors have been found or when the 
next one will be encountered. People will not trust a 
product unless they are convinced that it has been 
tested adequately. 
Lack of agreement on the desired function. Most 
people find it extremely difficult to say what behaviour 
they want from a computer system. Often, when asked 
to state requirements, the reply is something like, “I 
will know it when I see it”. After delivery, we hear, 
“That’s not it”. People do not trust software when they 
keep discovering new requirements as they try to use 
it.  
 
3. Comparison with hardware systems 
 
Although we are fully aware that our lives will de-
pend on the work of a large team of Engineers, most of 
us climb into airplanes without much concern. We 
know that the products are complex and that the failure 
of even a small part might put us in danger but we do 
trust the product. Again, it is easy to list some of the 
reasons: 
The track record of mechanical and electrical sys-
tems is good. 
Although the products are complex, they have a 
clearly visible structure that allows them to be divided 
in parts, each with precise specifications, and each part 
can be inspected and understood separately. 
Testing of mechanical and electrical systems is a 
well-developed, mathematics and physics based pro-
fession. The properties that need to be confirmed are 
well defined and the methods that lead to confidence 
are understood. 
There is little doubt about what functions are ex-
pected from the vehicle and from each of its compo-
nents. These have been documented, reviewed, and 
used in the review of internal designs. 
If we wish to increase the trustworthiness of soft-
ware we must improve our ability to inspect, test, and 
specify software systems and their components. 
 
4. Good documentation can make software 
more trustworthy 
 
If we look at the methods used to engender confi-
dence in mechanical and electrical engineering prod-
ucts, we will see that documentation of the function, 
design, and components of those products, plays an 
essential role. The professional Engineering documen-
tation used in those processes is precise, abstract, and, 
designed for use as a reference document rather than 
an introduction. 
Good documentation helps us to conduct more ef-
fective inspections and tests. Precise documents allow 
Engineers to confirm that if each component meets its 
stated specification, the product will be satisfactory. 
Combining testing and mathematical methods, we can 
confirm that each component does meet its specifica-
tion.  
In the remainder of this section, we discuss what is 
required of this documentation. 
Documentation must be precise. Precise docu-
ments do not allow differing interpretations. State-
ments such as “The system must shut down if the tem-
perature is over limit for too long” are obviously im-
precise. However, although “The system must shut 
down if the average temperature over the most recent 
3 second period is above 89 C” is much more precise, 
it still does not indicate whether we are taking about 
mean, median, or rms (root of the mean square) aver-
ages. Usually, precision in engineering requires the use 
of mathematical expressions. 
Documentation must be abstract. We consider 
documentation to be abstract if it refers only to observ-
able, information and abstracts from (does not men-
tion) anything that a user or using-program could not 
observe. This is a special case of a more general defi-
nition of “an abstraction” as something that represents 
many distinct things. Abstract documents represent all 
implementations that have the properties they describe. 
Abstract documentation of devices with memory must 
be able to refer to past (as well as present) input and 
output values.  
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Document must be designed for easy retrieval of 
specific facts. Reference documents are not introduc-
tory or overview documentation; they assume general 
familiarity with the product and environment. It is en-
demic in Computer Science to mix reference documen-
tation with introductory material. The usual collection 
of syntactic information and informal comments that 
come with software is also not adequate. Separate 
documentation should be available for those who are 
first becoming familiar with the general nature and 
structure of a product.  
Reference documents must be designed as reposito-
ries suitable for information retrieval. Reference docu-
mentation must be an easily accessed source of trust-
worthy and detailed information about the program 
and its behaviour. Using a reference document, one 
should be able to quickly answer questions such as: 
• What will this component do if it receives the 
input sequence ...? 
• What are the circumstances that lead to the out-
put of ...? 
• How can I get this component to ...? 
Reference documentation must be organized ac-
cording to strict rules that dictate one-and-only-one 
place for each fact. They are not designed to be read 
from start to finish but to make it easy to quickly find 
an accurate answer to a specific question. 
 
5. The content of key software documents 
 
The secret of making any product more trustworthy 
is the old adage, “divide-and-conquer”. We need to be 
able to look at a set of small components in such a way 
that we are confident that if all of the components are 
trustworthy the product as a whole can be trusted. 
With complex products this means that each of the 
components must be precisely specified and that the 
correctness of a component can be verified knowing 
only that component’s specification and the specifica-
tion of the components that it uses. Those specifica-
tions are the documents that we have been discussing. 
Clearly, the process will only work if the documents 
are accurate, precise, and complete. The process will 
be easier if the documents are abstract because this 
reduces the amount of information that must be con-
sidered.  
Many people are surprised to learn that it is possible 
to define the required contents of software documenta-
tion mathematically. Each document has a distinct pur-
pose and intended audience, but all represent a relation 
(set of ordered pairs). Most of those relations are func-
tions. For example: 
System requirements documentation must be a 
representation of a set of relations between time-
functions that represent the visible past history of the 
system and the values of the system’s outputs. The 
domain of the relation must include all possible histo-
ries of the inputs and outputs of the system (see [5]). 
Software component interface documentation 
must be a representation of the relation between a se-
quence of event descriptions (traces) and the present 
output values of the component. The domain of the 
relation must be the set of all possible histories of the 
input and output values. 
Program function documentation (for terminating 
programs) must be a representation of the LD-relation 
between starting and stopping states of the program. 
The domain of the relation must include all states with 
the property that if the program starts in that state, ter-
mination is possible. The competence set of the LD-
relation includes all starting states for which termina-
tion is guaranteed [11]. 
Component internal design documentation must 
be a representation of an abstraction relation and the 
program relations of the principle programs in the 
component. The domain of the abstraction relation 
must include all reachable internal states of the com-
ponent. The range of the relation is a set of traces that 
includes all possible histories of the component.  
A document is considered an accurate description if 
every ordered pair that can occur is included in the 
relation and all pairs that are included can occur. This 
is discussed in more detail in [13]. 
 
6. Descriptions of piecewise-continuous re-
lations 
 
The content descriptions in Section 4 are simple but 
quite abstract. We need to be able to provide readable 
representations of these relations. If conventional 
mathematical notation is used the result is often some-
thing that its author would not want to read. Fig. 1 is a 
precise abstract description of the behaviour required 
of a keyboard testing program used at Dell in Limer-
ick, Ireland. To learn more about the meaning of the 
relations and predicates that appear in this expression 
you can read [1] but the exact meaning is not important 
here. 
It is clear that although this expression is complete, 
precise, and abstract, it is not useful as a reference 
document. Moreover, it is very tiresome to check the 
correctness of this expression. Simply counting the 
parentheses is difficult and a true semantic check 
would be very difficult and time consuming for most 
software developers. With a great deal of effort one 
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could make minor improvements in the format and 
construction of this expression, but our experience is 
that software developers asked to write or read docu-
mentation in this form will not do so willingly and will 
argue that it is not worth the effort.  
However, since 1977 [6], the senior author has been 
using a novel form of expression, which we call tabu-
lar expressions. A tabular expression that is equivalent 
to Fig. 1 is shown in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Example of an abstract description  
that is too difficult to read 
 
 
Tabular expressions allow the expression to be 
parsed so that it is easy to check for completeness, 
consistency, and correctness. To check for complete-
ness and correctness of this table, one makes sure that 
the cases in the header grids are mutually exclusive 
and cover all cases. One can check the correctness one 
case (cell) at a time.  
Our experience with expressions in this form has 
been that practitioners will use them and prefer them to 
long textual paragraphs because they can quickly and 
easily find the information that they need. Our experi-
ence also suggests that errors are less likely using tabu-
lar expressions. 
When tabular expressions were first introduced to 
the Software Engineering community, some called 
them “semi-formal”. In fact, they are fully formal - 
their meaning has been defined in a variety of ways. 
We define them by showing how an equivalent con-
ventional expression. The above is only one of many 
types of tabular expressions that a practitioner can use. 
The same relation can be described in many ways; the 
practitioner is free to choose the one that is best for 
readers or writers. The best form for those who prepare 
a table may not be the best for use as a reference. Al-
gorithms for converting from one form to another have 
been developed [18]. 
While a glance at the small examples that fit in pub-
lishable papers may give the impression that such ex-
pressions are only practical for small examples, our 
experience shows the contrary. The newer models of 
tabular expressions that we are using allow the follow-
ing techniques to be used when things get complex: 
• The headers can be hierarchically structured as 
illustrated above. 
• The dimension of the table can be increased 
from two to three, four or more to allow a 
speedier "look up". 
• The expressions in cells can be tabular expres-
sions. 
 
6. Example of precise documentation – 
TFM specifications 
 
As an example of precise documentation, we con-
sider the Trace Function Method (TFM) for specifying 
or describing components or modules. TFM has been 
successfully applied for two industrial projects [16, 1] 
and is being used at the Software Quality Research 
Laboratory in Limerick for several projects.  
TFM specifications determine values of every out-
put of a software component (module) as a function of 
the history of events affecting this module. An event is 
a discrete point in time when the component reads or 
changes the values of global variables. Each event is 
described by an event descriptor, which contains 
names and values of the global variables before and 
after the event. We call a sequence of event descriptors 
a trace. 
We use tabular representations of mathematical 
functions. The tables can be created systematically, 
identifying conditions that divide the traces into mutu-
ally exclusive and exhaustive subsets at the every step. 
To illustrate TFM, we consider an electronic date 
display device (Fig. 2). 
 
(N(T)=2∧keyOK∧(¬(T=_)∧N(p(T))=1)) ∨ 
(N(T)=1∧(T=_∨(¬(T=_)∧N(p(T))=1)) ∧ 
(¬keyOK∧¬prevkeyOK∧¬prevkeyesc)) 
∨((¬(T=_)∧N(p(T))=1) ∧((¬keyOK∧keyesc∧ 
¬prevkeyesc) ∨(¬keyOK∧keyesc∧ 
prevkeyesc∧prevexpkeyesc)) ∨ 
((N(T)=N(p(T))+1) ∧(¬(T=_)∧ 
(1<N(p(T))<L)) ∧(keyOK)) ∨ 
((N(T)=N(p(T))-1)) ∧(¬keyOK∧¬keyesc∧ 
(¬prevkeyOK∧prevkeyesc∧preprevkeyOK)∨ 
prevkeyOK) ∧((¬(T=_)∧(1<N(p(T))<L)) ∨ 
(¬(T=_)∧N(p(T))=L))) ∨((N(T)=N(p(T))) ∧ 
(¬(T=_)∧(1<N(p(T))≤L))∧((¬keyOK∧ 
¬keyesc∧(¬prevkeyOK∧prevkeyesc∧ 
¬preprevkeyOK)) ∨ (¬keyOK ∧¬prevkeyOK 
∧ ¬prevkeyesc) ∨(¬keyOK∧keyesc∧ 
¬prevkeyesc) ∨ ¬keyOK∧keyesc∧ 
prevkeyesc∧prevexpkeyesc)) ∨  
((N(P(T)=Fail) ∧(¬keyOK∧keyesc ∧ 
prevkeyesc∧¬prevexpkeyesc) ∧ 
(1≤N(p(T))≤L)) ∨ ((N(P(T)=Pass) ∧(¬(T= _)∧ 
N(p(T))=L) ∧(keyOK)) 
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Table 1.  
Tabular expression 
 
N(T)=   T 
= _ 
¬(T = _ ) ∧ 
    N(p(T))=
1 
1<N(p(T))<
L  
N(p(T))=
L  
keyOK  2 N(p(T))+1 Pass 
(¬prevkeyOK 
∧ prevkeyesc ∧ 
preprevkeyOK) ∨ 
prevkeyOK  
  N(p(T))-1 N(p(T))-1 
¬prevkeyOK ∧ 
prevkeyesc ∧ 
¬preprevkeyOK  
  N(p(T)) N(p(T)) 
¬keyesc
∧ 
¬prevkeyOK ∧ 
¬prevkeyesc  
1 1 N(p(T)) N(p(T)) 
¬prevkeyesc   1 N(p(T)) N(p(T)) 
prevkeyesc ∧ 
¬prevexpkeyesc  
 Fail Fail Fail 
¬keyOK
∧ 
keyesc∧ 
prevkeyesc ∧ 
prevexpkeyesc  
 1 N(p(T)) N(p(T)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Electronic date display device 
 
The date display device shows the current date 
(day and month) and has two buttons (“set” and 
“up”) to set up an initial date. The “set” button de-
termines the mode (i.e., what we are going to set) and 
switches between “day” and “month”. The small tri-
angle indicates the current mode. The “up” button 
increments the selected quantity by one until “day” 
equals 31 or “month” equals 12 and then starts the 
cycle from 1. The initial date is 1/1. 
For this example, a trace describes a sequence of 
button presses, e.g. T1= set.up.up.up.up or T2= 
sup.up.set.set.up.set.up.up.up. For every trace T, the 
output function returns a 3-tuple (S(T), D(T), M(T)), 
where S(T) ∈  {day, month} is the current mode,  
D(T) ∈  {1, 2, …31} is the day displayed, and M(T) 
∈  {1, 2, …12} is the month displayed. We use two 
standard functions to reflect the history of operation: 
r(T) is the most recent event descriptor in Trace T.;  
p(T) is the trace T with the most recent event descrip-
tor removed. For example, if T=set.up.set then 
r(T)=set and p(T)=set.up. We can describe the re-
quired behaviour of the electronic date display device 
using one tabular expression (Tab. 2).  
For real software, TFM tables can be more com-
plicated and additional tables for auxiliary functions 
are often necessary. However, even for complex pro-
grams, the size of a TFM specification is often sur-
prisingly small. This is because the documents are 
abstract, i.e. they do not show any implementation 
details or models of those details. 
 
7. Use of documentation at different 
stages of software product development 
and maintenance 
 
Software design. One of the tools used to in-
crease the trustworthiness of mechanical and electri-
cal problems is very demanding review of designs 
27 / 03 
set up 
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before implementation. Using mathematical tools 
such as differential equations, one can estimate such 
quantities as power consumption, heat production, 
and distortion from circuit diagrams and other design 
documents. As software is now developed, there is 
no possibility of doing a careful analysis until code is 
produced because the documentation, if any is pro-
duced, is not precise enough.  
The precise mathematical documentation dis-
cussed in this paper changes that situation. Research 
on relational methods such as those described in [17], 
gives us equations that must be true if a design is 
correct. Without module interface specifications and 
internal design documents, these requirements remain 
in the theoretical domain. With such documents, one 
can check designs before proceeding further with the 
implementation. This can save a lot of wasted effort 
that comes from correctly implementing an erroneous 
design.  
Software inspection. While, it is obviously “a 
good thing” to have design documents that were 
checked, it is the code that has to be correct if we are 
to trust software products. It is quite possible to have 
a very good design but a fatally flawed implementa-
tion. Inspecting the code to eliminate the many minor 
errors that are common has proven incredibly diffi-
cult. Even “productive” inspections, inspections that 
reveal many errors, often fail to find other errors.  
 
Table 2. 
 
TFM specification of Electronic date display device 
(S(T), D(T), M(T)) ≡ 
 
T =_ (day, 1, 1) 
S(p(T))=day (month, D(p(T)), M(p(T))) r(T)=set ∧ 
S(p(T))=month (day, D(p(T)), M(p(T))) 
D(p(T))=31 (S(p(T)), 1, M(p(T))) S(p(T))=day ∧ ¬ (D(p(T))=31) (S(p(T)), D(p(T))+1, M(p(T)))
M(p(T))=12 (S(p(T)), D(p(T)), 1) 
¬ (T =_) ∧ 
 
r(T)=up ∧ 
S(p(T))=month ∧ ¬ (M(p(T))=12) (S(p(T)), D(p(T)), M(p(T))+1)
 
Software has many subtle interactions between 
components and one must have an incredible mem-
ory for detail to find the errors.  
Experience reported in [12] and [10] has shown 
that precise documentation enables us to conduct 
very effective software inspections. The software is 
decomposed into a set of components and each com-
ponent presented as a set of displays. Using descrip-
tions of the components in the displays and the com-
ponent interface specifications, we can inspect the 
displays one-at-a-time and know that if each display 
is correct, the whole system is correct. This is dis-
cussed in more detail in [10]. 
Software testing. Testing is an essential tool for 
increasing confidence in our products. However, test-
ers in the software area work with three handicaps: 
• Because of the lack of precise documentation, 
preparation for the tests is delayed until code 
is available and must be done under extreme 
time pressure. 
• Useful coverage measures are “white box” 
that is they depend on the code. 
• When test results are obtained, there can be 
disagreement on whether the behaviour is 
correct or not. 
Precise documentation helps to alleviate all of 
these problems because: 
• Preparation for tests can begin as soon as de-
sign documents are approved. 
• Precise design documents tell us exactly 
which results are acceptable and leave no 
room for arguments over the correctness of 
results.  
• Precise documents provide a basis for “black 
box” coverage measures. For example, we 
can make sure that each cell in a tabular ex-
pression is adequately tested.  
We can use precise specifications to identify test 
values where past experience shows that errors are 
more likely. For example, if we know where certain 
functions pass through zero or have singularities, we 
can be sure to test these “interesting points” [3]. 
Other “interesting values” are the boundaries be-
tween different rows and columns in a tabular speci-
fication.  
242
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Limerick. Downloaded on May 26, 2009 at 04:41 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
Precise documentation is also helpful for statisti-
cal testing. The purpose of statistical testing is reli-
ability estimation. Reliability estimation requires an 
operational profile – a probabilistic characterization 
of how a software system is expected to be used [2, 
9]. This profile is used to make sure situations are 
tested with a frequency proportional to their expected 
occurrence. Precise specifications can be used as a 
basis for describing the operational profile by associ-
ating probabilities with each cell in a tabular expres-
sion.  
The use of precise documentation for improved 
testing is also discussed in [7, 14, 15, 19]. 
 
8. The practicality of the approach 
 
Whereas many attempts at technology transfer are 
intended to transfer research ideas to industry, the 
ideas discussed in this paper originated with indus-
trial problems and academic research has been used 
to refine them and put them on a solid mathematical 
foundation. The first use of tabular expressions was 
to document the requirements for real-time military 
software [6]. The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, 
where the ideas were first developed has built tools 
and continues to work with Navy contractors on 
practical problems. These ideas were then applied in 
a telephony system at Bell Labs [7], where they were 
subsequently emulated by other projects. The inspec-
tion methods discussed in [12] and [10] were proven 
to be extremely effective by subsequent experience; 
in 15 years of use and modification, no missed errors 
were discovered [21]. More recently, experience us-
ing new forms of the documentation has been found 
to be effective in joint work with Dell [1] and Erics-
son [16]. We usually get a mixed reaction from our 
industrial partners. Engineers like the brevity and 
precision of documents that they get from others, but 
feel that they do not have time to prepare them. Man-
agers like the abstract idea of producing precise de-
sign documents but seem unwilling to allow for the 
“up-front-investment” that is needed to produce 
them. Producing these documents requires that we 
take the time to answer questions that are usually not 
answered until the coding phase. Some view this time 
as unproductive. Our experience has been that the 
coding phase is shortened and testing times can be 
reduced if this investment is made. It is difficult, 
however, to engender faith in future pay-back in 
managers who have found earlier documentation 
efforts or earlier attempts at “formal methods” to 
have little value.  
We believe that the first areas to take up these 
methods must be projects where the software is criti-
cal, either for safety reasons or because it is needed 
for commercial success. In the safety area, our ex-
perience suggests that the first step should be to in-
troduce more demanding standards for documenta-
tion, testing and inspection [20]. There are now many 
standards documents but because they do not demand 
precise abstract documentation they are effectively 
“toothless”. Mathematical methods can put the teeth 
into such standards. 
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